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Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage 
abstract.  Despite the promise of Gideon, providing “the guiding hand of counsel” to 
indigent defendants remains unmanageable, largely because the nation’s public defender offices 
are overworked and underfunded. Faced with overwhelming caseloads and inadequate resources, 
public defenders must engage in triage, deciding which cases deserve attention and which do 
not. Although scholars have recognized the need to develop standards for making these difficult 
judgments, they have paid little attention to how implicit, i.e., unconscious, biases may affect 
those decisions. There is reason to suspect that unconscious biases will influence public defender 
decisionmaking due to generations of racial stereotypes specific to stigmatized groups and crime. 
This Essay urges legal scholars and practitioners to consider how implicit biases may influence 
the rationing of defense entitlements and suggests ways to safeguard against the effects of these 
unconscious forces. 
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As we commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, there is little doubt that its promise 
to provide “the guiding hand of counsel” to indigent defendants remains 
largely unrealized.1 There are many reasons for this, including the lack of 
political will to fulfill Gideon’s promise by guaranteeing adequate funding and 
imposing caseload limits. Although some jurisdictions created public defender 
(PD) offices to meet the demand for services, attorneys in the majority of these 
offices handle cases well over the maximum recommended limit. 
Scholars rightly bemoan the current state of indigent defense. However, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that, until much-needed changes 
in the provision of indigent defense services occur, PDs will engage in triage, 
the process of prioritizing cases for attention. This reality raises important 
questions about how to guide attorney decisionmaking in order to avoid ad hoc 
judgments. We focus on state PDs rather than on assigned counsel and 
contract systems because state PD offices handle the majority of indigent cases 
in state criminal proceedings.2 
Almost no attention has been paid to the effects that unconscious, i.e., 
implicit, biases may have on PD decisionmaking.3 This is surprising because 
over three decades of well-established social science research demonstrates that 
these biases are ubiquitous and can influence judgments, especially when 
information deficits exist. Worse, these biases are likely to be particularly 
influential in circumstances where time is limited, individuals are cognitively 
taxed, and decisionmaking is highly discretionary—exactly the context in 
which PDs find themselves. Thus, the domain of PDs and triage presents a rare 
confluence of factors ripe for the influence of implicit biases (IBs) and 
consequently deserves far more scholarly treatment than it has received. 
We argue that it is critical to consider the probable effects of IBs on PD 
decisionmaking because zealous and effective advocacy is a scarce resource in 
the current environment. Thus, the distribution of this resource should not be 
based on unconscious judgments tied to a defendant’s race. In the Parts that 
follow, we consider how IBs may affect PD decisionmaking and end with some 
suggestions for safeguarding against their influence. This Essay focuses on the 
 
1.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
2.  NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 53 (2009), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf. 
3.  But see Andrea D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense 
Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755 (2012). 
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effects of IBs on black clients because psychological research disproportionately 
addresses anti-black prejudice. However, IBs are likely to impact judgments of 
other clients who are similarly stereotyped as dangerous and criminal. 
i .  overview of implicit racial biases 
Implicit social cognition is a branch of psychology that studies how mental 
processes that occur outside of awareness and that operate without conscious 
control can affect judgments about and behaviors toward social groups.4 These 
unconscious processes are simply an extension of the way humans think and 
process information. Briefly stated, our mental processes facilitate 
decisionmaking by making automatic associations between concepts.5 For 
example, people might automatically associate “doctor” with “hospital” and 
other related ideas. These associations are linked in our minds because they 
often occur together. 
Implicit racial biases refer to the unconscious associations we make about 
racial groups. The existence of these biases is consistent with the conclusion of 
more general research that we automatically and unconsciously use heuristics6 
to cope with the enormous amount of information that bombards us.7 Implicit 
racial biases facilitate our ability to “manage information overload and make 
decisions more efficiently and easily”8 by “filtering information, filling in 
missing data, and automatically categorizing people according to cultural 
stereotypes.”9 Like all unconscious mental processes, implicit racial biases 
are unintentional because they are not planned responses; involuntary, 
because they occur automatically in the presence of an environmental 
cue; and effortless, in that they do not deplete an individual’s limited 
information processing resources. Those characteristics can be 
 
4.  L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2036 
(2011). 
5.  See John R. Anderson, A Spreading Activation Theory of Memory, 22 J. VERBAL LEARNING & 
VERBAL BEHAV. 261 (1983). 
6.  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). 
7.  For an in-depth discussion of the relationship between implicit biases and heuristics, see L. 
Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 293 (2012). 
8.  Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent 
Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 485 (2004). 
9.  Id. 
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contrasted with conscious processes, or mental activities of which the 
person is aware, that they intend, that they volitionally control, and 
that require effort.10 
The fact that these biases are unconscious means that they “are not consciously 
accessible through introspection.”11 
We use the term implicit racial biases to refer both to unconscious 
stereotypes (beliefs about social groups) and attitudes (feelings, either positive 
or negative, about social groups). Implicit stereotypes and attitudes result from 
the practice we get associating groups (e.g., blacks) with traits (e.g., 
criminality). This practice stems from repeated exposures to cultural 
stereotypes that are ubiquitous within a given society. For instance, the cultural 
stereotype of blacks as violent, hostile, aggressive, and dangerous persists 
within our society.12 Merely being aware of these stereotypes, without 
personally endorsing them as correct, is sufficient to activate unconscious 
stereotypes in a person’s mind—often resulting in chronic associations that we 
call implicit attitudes.13 The underlying theory is that some groups (again, like 
blacks) are so commonly associated with negative traits (again, like criminality) 
that there is a general tendency to categorize the group with anything negative 
because of the overall negativity of the associations. 
IBs can be activated by racial cues present in the environment,14 including 
another person’s skin color, age, gender, and accent.15 Where blacks are 
concerned, even thinking about crime may be sufficient to activate IBs. This is 
because the association between blacks and crime is so pervasive that it has 
become bidirectional—thoughts of criminality unconsciously activate thoughts 
of blacks, and reciprocally, thoughts of blacks activate thoughts of crime.16 
 
10.  Id. (citations omitted). 
11.  Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1129 (2012). 
12.  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004); Graham & Lowery, supra note 8, at 485; 
Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1322 (2008). 
13.  See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate 
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1323 (2002). 
14.  See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial 
Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 310 (2010). 
15.  John A. Bargh, Mark Chen & Lara Burrows, Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of 
Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 
241-42 (1996). 
16.  Eberhardt et al., supra note 12, at 883. 
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Over three decades’ worth of research repeatedly demonstrates that IBs, 
once activated, influence many of our behaviors and judgments in ways we 
cannot consciously access and often cannot control.17 Furthermore, IBs can 
predict real-world behaviors.18 For instance, one study found that for every 
additional standard deviation of added IB, employers were five percent less 
likely to hire a job applicant with an Arab- or Muslim-sounding name than a 
white-sounding name.19 
There is ample reason for concern that IBs will affect public defenders’ 
judgments because IBs thrive in situations where individuals make decisions 
quickly with imperfect information20 and when they are cognitively depleted,21 
anxious,22 or distracted.23 As we discuss next, PDs work in precisely this type of 
environment. 
i i .  public defender triage 
Indigent defense is in a state of crisis. Defender offices are chronically 
underfunded, resulting in crushing caseloads. Most offices do not have 
caseload limits, and those that do regularly surpass them.24 Thus, despite the 
existence of dedicated and committed PDs, the lack of adequate resources 
 
17.  See Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 (2007). 
18.  See generally Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association 
Test: II. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009) 
(describing studies demonstrating the real-world effects of implicit bias). 
19.  See Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence 1, 4-5 (Inst. for 
the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2764, 2007), http://d-nb.info/98812002X/34 
(discussing the difference in receiving callback job interviews between applicants with Arab 
or Muslim names and applicants with Swedish names); see also Marianne Bertrand & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field 
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 998 (2004) 
(demonstrating that job applicants with white sounding names such as Emily or Greg were 
50% more likely to receive callback job interviews in Boston and 49% more likely in Chicago 
than applicants with black-sounding names like Jamal). 
20.  Graham & Lowery, supra note 8, at 486. 
21.  See Olesya Govorun & B. Keith Payne, Ego-Depletion and Prejudice: Separating Automatic and 
Controlled Components, 24 SOC. COGNITION 111 (2006). 
22.  See Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interactions: Costs, 
Consequences, and Possibilities, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 318 (2007). 
23.  See Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application 
of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 509 (1991). 
24.  NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 2, at 67. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2259079
18.RICHARDSON&GOFF_PREPRESS_V1.DOC 4/29/2013  2:58:20 PM 
the yale law journal 122:100   2013  
106 
 
coupled with unmanageable caseloads make it virtually impossible to provide 
zealous and effective representation to every client. 
The financial impediments to realizing the promise of Gideon must be 
remedied. In the interim, however, PDs are forced to make difficult resource-
allocation decisions among their clients. These resources include an attorney’s 
time and mental energy, as well as purely monetary resources, such as funds to 
hire experts. 
In an ideal world, defenders would have unlimited opportunities to 
interview and investigate all of the state’s witnesses, canvass the neighborhood 
where the crime occurred, and otherwise thoroughly investigate the case. 
Furthermore, defenders could conduct legal research, file motions, request 
funds for expert assistance, and engage in extensive plea negotiations. They 
also would have the time to develop relationships with clients, which is critical 
because clients have important information that can aid attorneys in their trial 
preparation and their arguments for pretrial release, better plea offers, and 
reduced sentences. 
However, most PDs do not work in an ideal environment. They cannot 
realistically provide each client with zealous and effective advocacy. PDs are 
forced by circumstances to engage in triage, i.e., determining which clients 
merit attention and which do not. As one defender put it, “The present 
M.A.S.H. style operating procedure requires public defenders to divvy effective 
legal assistance to a narrowing group of clients, [forcing them] to choose 
among clients as to who will receive effective legal assistance.”25 
It is no wonder that the provision of indigent defense is often likened to 
medical triage.26 Similar to hospital emergency rooms, PD offices face demands 
that far outpace their resources. In order to save time to defend the cases that 
they find deserving, attorneys may plead out other cases quickly27 or go to trial 
unprepared.28 This reality means that for most PDs, the question is not “how 
do I engage in zealous and effective advocacy,” but rather, “given that all my 
clients deserve aggressive advocacy, how do I choose among them?”29 
 
25.  Id. at 69. 
26.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1169, 1180-81 (2003). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
85, 93-94 (2007). 
29.  We have paraphrased David Luban here. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1765 (1993). 
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We are unaware of any PD office that has formal triage standards to help 
attorneys make these difficult judgments. Even if standards do exist, they 
cannot completely eliminate attorney discretion. For instance, even with 
standards, attorneys must still make judgment calls about whether to advise 
clients to take a case to trial or to accept a plea offer, and IBs can affect these 
evaluations. As a result, two similarly situated clients may be treated 
differently. 
On this point, a comparison to medical triage is illuminating. Hospitals 
have developed objective triage standards to guide medical decisionmaking.30 
Despite this, implicit racial biases still affect decisions. In one study, 
researchers determined that emergency room doctors’ implicit racial biases 
predicted their treatment decisions.31 More specifically, “[a]s physicians’ 
prowhite implicit bias increased, so did their likelihood of treating white 
patients and not treating black patients” with procedures to abort a heart 
attack.32 Hence, while objective triage standards are important, they are not a 
panacea for implicit bias. 
Given the similarities between PD offices and emergency rooms, it would 
be surprising if IBs did not affect defender judgments. One study of the 
implicit attitudes of death penalty defense lawyers found evidence of IBs.33 
Furthermore, abundant research demonstrates that IBs affect individuals who, 
like defenders, work in cognitively taxing environments and must make 
complex decisions under time pressure and in the face of ambiguous facts.34 No 
group appears immune to the possibility of influence. Moreover, IBs can affect 
judgments even if PDs are committed to zealous advocacy, and consciously and 
genuinely reject negative stereotypes and attitudes about marginalized 
 
30.  Chet D. Schrader & Lawrence M. Lewis, Racial Disparity in Emergency Department Triage, 49 
J. EMERGENCY MED. 511, 511 (2013). 
31.  See Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis 
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007). 
32.  Id. The procedure in question, thrombolysis, attempts to break up blood clots and is often 
used to treat heart attacks. See Thrombolytic Therapy, MEDLINEPLUS, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007089.htm (last updated June 1, 2010). 
33.  Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1545-51 (2004). We are unaware of any study that examines the 
relative number of hours lawyers spend on black versus white clients nor any that links 
differences in attorneys’ delivery of services to implicit biases. 
34.  See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., supra note 12; Phillip Atiba Goff et al., “I’m Not a Racist, but I 
Will [Mess] You Up”: Stereotype Threat as a Status-Threat that Provokes Aggressive 
Responses (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Phillip Atiba Goff et al., 
The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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populations.35 In other words, individuals’ conscious attitudes are weakly 
related to their implicit attitudes. As such, even the most egalitarian individual 
can fall victim to IBs absent other precautions.36 In fact, confidence in one’s 
own egalitarianism can be an obstacle to identifying IBs,37 meaning that 
individuals who became PDs in order to fight racial injustice may be just as 
susceptible to the effects of IBs as those with less noble motives. Additionally, 
research suggests that even if PDs are nonwhite themselves, they are in danger 
of being influenced by IBs.38 
Next, we examine how IBs may affect defender judgments. While factors 
other than IBs can influence triage decisionmaking, this Essay focuses solely on 
the possible effects of IBs. We will provide some discussion of the research; 
however, given the constraints of this Essay, we refer the reader to our prior 
work and other useful sources for an extended discussion of the underlying 
studies, including their validity, reliability, and effect sizes.39 
i i i .  implicit biases’  effects on triage judgments 
Defender triage involves choices about how to allocate precious resources. 
These triage decisions begin from the moment the PD receives the case. 
Attorneys likely use a number of different criteria to make these decisions. For 
instance, they may prioritize cases based upon their assessment of whether the 
state can prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Or they may expend more 
effort on cases in which they believe their client is factually innocent.40 While 
 
35.  But see infra Section IV.A (discussing the effects of egalitarian attitudes on implicit bias). 
36.  John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and 
Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 65-67 (2002). 
37.  See Cynthia M. Frantz et al., A Threat in the Computer: The Race Implicit Association Test as a 
Stereotype Threat Experience, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1611, 1611-22 (2004). 
38.  Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative 
Action”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006) (noting that “[s]eventy-five percent of Whites 
(and fifty percent of Blacks) show anti-Black bias”). 
39.  E.g., Richardson, supra note 4; L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2011); Richardson & Goff, supra note 7; see also, e.g., John T. 
Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Prejudice Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of 
Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No 
Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ON ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 41 (2009); Kang et al., 
supra note 11; Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the 
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010). 
40.  We, like others, take the view that public defenders should not focus on cases of factual 
innocence. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, but Do, Care About 
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the science on IBs does not permit us to identify when IB is operating in any 
particular case, the concern of this Essay is the aggregate probability that, given 
the prevalence of IBs, PDs’ decisions may be frequently affected without 
correction for the negative consequences. What follows is a discussion of how 
IBs may influence a host of triage decisions. 
A. Biased Evaluations of Evidence 
Of necessity, defenders must begin evaluating cases from the moment they 
are assigned. Their initial evaluations will affect a variety of subsequent 
decisions important to the ultimate resolution of the case. For instance, after 
reviewing the discovery, they may decide that expending resources to conduct a 
fact investigation would be a waste of time because the state’s evidence is 
strong. On the other hand, if attorneys determine that the state’s case has 
weaknesses they can exploit, they may expend more resources to defend the 
client, including investigating the case and engaging in vigorous plea 
bargaining. Thus, early appraisals of cases can become self-fulfilling 
prophecies. While attorneys must evaluate a case’s merits, the problem is that 
IBs may influence these judgments. 
Studies consistently demonstrate that IBs can affect evaluations of 
ambiguous evidence. In one, a researcher activated IBs by subliminally priming 
subjects with words associated with blacks, such as slavery.41 Afterwards, the 
researcher asked subjects to read a vignette about a racially unidentified male 
and to rate his ambiguous behaviors on a number of traits. The results 
established that IBs made subjects more likely to rate his behaviors as hostile. 
Another study utilizing the identical method found that, when IBs were 
activated, police and probation officers judged a male juvenile as being more 
culpable and more deserving of severe punishment than when these biases 
were not activated.42 IBs can even influence how mock jurors evaluate evidence 
that is ambiguous as to guilt. These biases not only caused jurors to be more 
 
Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2010); Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 485, 509 n.100 (2000). 
41.  Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989). “Priming refers to the incidental activation of 
knowledge structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current situational 
context.” Bargh, Chen & Burrows, supra note 15, at 230. “Subliminal” means that the 
priming occurs below the level of conscious awareness. Subliminal priming is achieved by a 
variety of methods and typically involves flashing images on a computer screen so quickly 
that individuals are unaware they saw anything. 
42.  Graham & Lowery, supra note 8, at 483. 
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likely “to judge the evidence as tending to indicate criminal guilt,” but “also 
more likely to believe that the defendant was guilty.”43 
When translated to the context of PD triage, these studies suggest that 
when clients are black or otherwise criminally stereotyped, IBs can influence 
evidence evaluation, potentially causing PDs to unintentionally interpret 
information as more probative of guilt. Consequently, PDs may determine that 
the state will have little difficulty meeting its burden of proof and thus, that the 
case does not warrant much effort. 
The effects of IBs on triage judgments can occur even before defenders 
meet their clients. At this point, attorneys likely have information about the 
client’s race. This knowledge, coupled with reading the discovery, is sufficient 
to activate IBs and their attendant effects.44 The consequences for the 
defendant can worsen once his attorney meets him, particularly if the client has 
stereotypically African features such as very dark skin.45 
Furthermore, the influence of IBs will be facilitated if the charge itself is 
associated with the client’s race. For instance, young black men serve as our 
mental prototype of the violent street criminal and drug dealer.46 If the client is 
black and the charge involves a drug offense, a judgment of guilt may be 
cognitively easier to make because of the strong implicit association between 
blacks and crime.47 This gut feeling can then affect the attorney’s views about 
the merits of the case. Of course, additional investigation might change her 
initial hunch. However, part of what defenders regulate is how much effort to 
expend in acquiring additional information. Hence, unless defenders have 
reason to second-guess their initial impressions, IBs can negatively affect 
judgments about cases involving clients stereotyped as criminal and crimes 
stereotyped as black. 
B. Biased Interactions 
The defender’s initial client meeting is another domain likely to influence 
triage decisions. For instance, during the meeting, attorneys will inevitably 
 
43.  Levinson & Young, supra note 14, at 310-11. 
44.  See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. 
45.  See infra Subsection III.C.2. 
46.  See Trawalter et al., supra note 12, at 1322. 
47.  See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., supra note 12, at 883 (demonstrating the relationship between 
blacks and crime); Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in 
Automatically Activated Attitudes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 815 (2001) 
(demonstrating the importance of context to the activation of IBs). 
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make judgments about client credibility. If lawyers do not credit their clients’ 
version of events, they may not follow up on leads or may forgo possible 
motions to suppress government evidence. Additionally, clients are important 
sources of witnesses and exculpatory and mitigating information. If the initial 
meeting goes badly, however, clients may not be willing to share information 
that might be crucial to the case, and attorneys may determine that the client 
will not be cooperative, forthcoming with information, or otherwise helpful to 
an investigation. Thus, an unpleasant interaction can influence how much time 
an attorney is willing to devote to a case. 
Unfortunately, IBs can adversely affect interactions with negatively 
stereotyped individuals. First, IBs can influence how attorneys interpret a 
client’s ambiguous behaviors and facial expressions. In one study, identical 
expressions were deemed more hostile on black faces than on white faces by 
subjects with high IB.48 In another, subjects with more IB assessed hostile 
expressions as lingering longer on black than white faces.49 Research also 
demonstrates that study participants interpret black actors engaging in 
ambiguous behaviors as more aggressive than white actors engaging in 
identical behaviors.50 In fact, when the actor is black, white subjects are more 
likely to attribute the negative behavior to the individual’s character rather than 
to the situation.51 
Second, IBs can negatively influence attorneys’ behaviors. In one study, 
when interacting with negatively stereotyped individuals, people tended to 
maintain a greater physical distance, make more speech errors, and end the 
contact earlier than with positively stereotyped individuals.52 Furthermore, 
unconscious stereotypes can cause people to act in accordance with them.53 For 
instance, research subjects who were subliminally primed with a black male 
face reacted with more hostility to bad news than those primed with white 
faces. This occurred, the researchers concluded, because subliminally priming 
participants with black male faces unconsciously activated the stereotype of 
 
48.  Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of 
Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 342 (2004). 
49.  Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the 
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640 (2003). 
50.  Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the 
Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 (1976). 
51.  Id. 
52.  Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial 
Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1974); see also Dovidio et al., supra note 
36 (finding that nonverbal behaviors can be affected by implicit bias). 
53.  Bargh, Chen & Burrows, supra note 15, at 241-42. 
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black hostility, which then influenced the participants’ behaviors.54 These 
behavioral effects of IB are problematic because individuals on the receiving 
end of negative behaviors may respond in kind. However, because the 
originators of the behavior are unaware of their own role in triggering the 
unpleasant response, they may attribute the negative behavior solely to the 
other. This “behavioral confirmation” effect55 explains how IBs can adversely 
influence interactions. 
Third, IBs can cause attorneys to treat stereotyped individuals in 
stereotype-consistent ways. Research demonstrates that stereotypes of blacks 
as untruthful lead police to push black suspects harder for confessions and to 
adopt more accusatory interrogation techniques.56 This approach may yield 
more anxious behaviors in suspects that, in turn, may produce perceptions of 
guilt.57 
With these studies in mind, imagine the interactions between negatively 
stereotyped clients and defenders. As a result of IB, the attorney may 
unconsciously exhibit hostility. The attorney may also be more likely to 
interpret the client’s body language and facial expressions as antagonistic. 
Furthermore, the attorney’s unconscious negative expectations may produce 
perceptions and attributions consistent with them. 
If the client mirrors the attorney’s behaviors, this will confirm the 
attorney’s initial negative expectations, and the attorney may attribute this 
behavior to the client’s disposition rather than to the attorney’s own behaviors 
or the situation. The resulting negative interaction can create a vicious cycle of 
mutual distrust and dislike, adversely affecting the attorney’s triage decisions. 
Spending time with a client can, of course, change these initial impressions. 
However, an unpleasant initial interaction may reduce the defender’s desire to 
do so.58 
 
54.  Id. at 239. 
55.  See Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-
Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
541, 542 (1997). 
56.  Cynthia J. Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in Criminal Interrogations: Why Innocent Black 
Suspects Are at Risk for Confessing Falsely, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 562 (2011). 
57.  Saul M. Kassin, Christine C. Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Behavioral Confirmation in the 
Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187 (2003). 
58.  See, e.g., Jason P. Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 455, 460 (2003) (finding that implicit attitudes are changeable). 
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C. Biased Acceptance of Punishments 
We have been discussing the effects that implicit stereotypes and attitudes 
may have on defender judgments. Here we will consider two additional types 
of implicit racial bias that can also influence decisionmaking: implicit 
dehumanization and features-based IB. 
1. Implicit Dehumanization 
Implicit dehumanization stems from a tendency to unconsciously associate 
highly stigmatized groups with nonhuman animals. Here, we focus on the 
unconscious association between blacks and apes because of its long history in 
our culture.59 Remarkably, this unconscious association can be activated even 
when people are not consciously aware of the association.60 However, once 
triggered, it predicts real-world behaviors. 
For instance, Goff and colleagues had subjects watch a video of police 
viciously beating a suspect. If subjects were subliminally primed with images of 
apes before watching the video, they were more likely to find the beating 
justified when the victim was black.61 However, when the victim was white or 
when the subjects were not subliminally primed, they did not endorse the 
beating. 
To determine whether implicit dehumanization could predict real-world 
behaviors, these researchers examined Philadelphia newspaper articles 
reporting on death-eligible cases, looking for ape-related metaphors. After 
controlling for factors other than race, they found that “Black defendants  
who were put to death were more likely to have apelike representations in the 
press  . . . than were those whose lives were spared.”62 Importantly, in previous 
experiments, the researchers found that implicit associations between blacks 
and apes (but not explicit associations) predicted similar behaviors in the lab, 
leading to the hypothesis that implicit dehumanization likely contributed to 
both the media representations of death-eligible defendants and the sentencing 
judgments. 
 
59.  For a discussion of this history, see Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit 
Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 292-94 (2008). 
60.  See id. 
61.  Id. at 302. 
62.  Id. at 304. 
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Recently, Goff and colleagues built on these findings in a juvenile justice 
context.63 They found that the more individuals unconsciously associated 
blacks with apes, the less innocent they thought black children suspected of a 
crime were. Worse yet, implicit dehumanization predicted racial disparities in 
the violent treatment of children by police officers. When the researchers 
compared police officers’ actual use-of-force history against juveniles with their 
implicit dehumanization score—the implicit association between blacks and 
apes—they found that police officers who held the association more strongly 
were also more likely to use force against black as opposed to white children. 
Taken together, these studies raise concerns that defenders may be more 
accepting of higher sentencing recommendations for black versus white clients 
and, thus, less likely to negotiate aggressively for lower sentences or to conduct 
mitigation investigations. While the effects of implicit dehumanization on PDs 
have yet to be demonstrated, the fact that implicit dehumanization shapes 
other actors’ behaviors in criminal-justice-related settings suggests that 
defenders are probably not immune. 
2. Features-Based Implicit Bias 
Research demonstrates that individuals with more stereotypically black 
features (i.e., darker skin, broader nose, and fuller lips) are unconsciously 
judged to be more dangerous and culpable than others.64 One study 
demonstrated the effect of features-based IB on outcomes in death penalty 
cases. After controlling for a wide range of factors, researchers found that fifty-
seven percent of black defendants in the half of the sample determined to have 
more stereotypically black features received death sentences, compared to 
twenty-four percent in the other half of the sample. The effect only appeared 
when the victim was white.65 
In another study, researchers examined whether “the degree to which . . . 
inmates manifested Afrocentric features” would predict sentence length after 
controlling for race, criminal history, and the seriousness of the crime.66 Their 
results were troubling. When comparing white defendants to each other, they 
 
63.  Goff et al., supra note 34. 
64.  See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 
15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 676-77 (2004) (discussing how Afrocentric features significantly 
correlate with harsher sentences). 
65.  Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants 
Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 384 (2006). 
66.  Blair et al., supra note 64, at 676. 
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discovered that those with more stereotypically black features received longer 
sentences.67 They found the same results when comparing black defendants to 
each other.68 This finding confirmed prior research that people unconsciously 
“use Afrocentric features to infer traits that are stereotypic of African 
Americans.”69 As a result, even within races, people with more stereotypically 
black features are perceived as being more criminal.70 In fact, one recent study 
found that subjects were more likely to shoot black individuals with more 
stereotypically “black” features than those with fewer stereotypically “black” 
features.71 
In sum, features-based IB may result in defenders unconsciously being 
more accepting of harsher sentences for some clients than others. Because of 
their belief that a tougher sentence is appropriate or likely to be imposed, PDs 
may be less likely to fight for their client’s release on bail and spend time, 
effort, and scarce resources negotiating a better plea deal. Hence, features-
based IB can affect a host of triage decisions that can disadvantage clients of all 
races who have stereotypically black features. 
iv.  recommendations 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, IBs may have pernicious effects 
on PD decisionmaking. However, while IBs are ubiquitous, they are also 
malleable.72 Consequently, defender offices may be able to implement 
strategies to help debias their attorneys. What follows are five 
recommendations that have the potential to mitigate or safeguard against the 
probable effects of IBs on defender judgments. However, given the constraints 
of this Essay, we only trace the broad outlines of each recommendation and do 
not address possible limitations. 
 
67.  Id. at 677. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 677-78; see also Eberhardt, supra note 12, at 877, 888 (demonstrating that more racially 
stereotypical black men are seen as more criminal). 
71.  Kimberly Barsamian Kahn & Paul G. Davies, Differentially Dangerous? Phenotypic Racial 
Stereotypicality Increases Implicit Bias Among Ingroup and Outgroup Members, 14 GROUP 
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 569, 573 (2011). 
72.  Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: 
Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800 (2001). 
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A. Office Culture 
A person’s motivations73 and ideological commitments may be important to 
reducing IBs.74 People highly motivated to be nonprejudiced can reduce or 
eliminate IBs’ effects on their behavior,75 especially if they are internally 
motivated.76 Additionally, high epistemic motivation—that is, requiring more 
information to feel comfortable making a decision—is associated with reduced 
reliance on stereotypes because it “increase[s] the tendency to engage in 
systematic information processing.”77 Furthermore, people committed to 
egalitarian goals may be better able to control the activation of IBs.78 This is 
good news for defender offices because many attorneys become defenders as a 
result of their commitments to equal justice. 
Since motivations appear to affect implicit bias, public defender offices 
should reward these motivations and also consider them when making hiring 
decisions.79 Some defender organizations are already attempting to transform 
the culture of their offices through “values-based” recruiting.80 For instance, 
Gideon’s Promise (formerly the Southern Public Defender Training Center) 
 
73.  See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of 
Motivations To Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845 
(2002). 
74.  Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web 
Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RESEARCH & PRACTICE 101, 106 (2002). 
75.  Margo J. Monteith et al., Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 73-75 (1998) (citing studies). 
76.  E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, The Active Control of Prejudice: Unpacking the Intentions 
Guiding Control Efforts, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 640 (2009); see also Leslie R.M. 
Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of External and Internal Motivation To Control Prejudice on 
Implicit Prejudice: The Mediating Role of Efforts To Control Prejudiced Responses, 26 BASIC & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 222 (2004) (finding that those with internal motivations to be 
nonprejudiced show decreased implicit biases compared to those who are only externally 
motivated). 
77.  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 163, 174-76 (2007). 
78.  See, e.g., Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through 
Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (1999). 
79.  See Robin Steinberg & David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender’s 
Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 130-31 (2004). 
80.  See, e.g., Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for 
Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 175 (2009). 
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screens new lawyers “for their receptiveness to client-centered values.”81 Paying 
attention to a new recruit’s client-centered values is important because the 
desire to develop relationships with and form positive impressions of members 
of stereotyped groups may help to reduce the activation of negative racial 
stereotypes.82 
Another important consideration during recruitment is the potential hire’s 
experiences navigating diverse environments. Research demonstrates that 
significant positive contact with individuals who do not fit our stereotypes 
about their group can reduce IB.83 For instance, one study found that people 
reporting more positive personal contacts with blacks were less likely to have 
negative beliefs about their criminality and violence.84 These considerations are 
job-related because any defender will almost certainly have negatively 
stereotyped people as clients. Furthermore, racial diversity among defenders 
themselves can be important to reducing IBs because it increases opportunities 
for positive interactions between racial group members of equal status, helps to 
create positive associations, and motivates people to make more accurate, 
nonstereotyped judgments.85 All of these factors reduce implicit bias. 
Finally, promoting people who demonstrate the desire to be fair and 
egalitarian will help to demonstrate the importance of these values within the 
office, thereby encouraging a culture that motivates attorneys to live up to such 
values. Group norms are among the most influential factors in changing 
attitudes of any kind.86 Individuals operating within an organizational culture 
of tolerance tend to become more tolerant—particularly when influential others 
 
81.  Jonathan A. Rapping, National Crisis, National Neglect: Realizing Justice Through 
Transformative Change, 13 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 351 (2010). 
82.  See Brian S. Lowery, Curtis D. Hardin & Stacey Sinclair, Social Influence Effects on Automatic 
Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842 (2001). 
83.  See, e.g., Shaki Asgari, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Nicole Gilbert Cote, When Does Contact with 
Successful Ingroup Members Change Self-Stereotypes? A Longitudinal Study Comparing the Effect 
of Quantity vs. Quality of Contact with Successful Individuals, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (2010). 
84.  B. Michelle Peruche & E. Ashby Plant, The Correlates of Law Enforcement Officers’ Automatic 
and Controlled Race-Based Responses to Criminal Suspects, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
193, 196 (2006). 
85.  See Linda R. Tropp & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Differential Relationships Between Intergroup 
Contact and Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1145 (2005). 
86.  See Deborah J. Terry & Michael A. Hogg, Group Norms and the Attitude-Behavior 
Relationship: A Role for Group Identification, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 776 
(1996). 
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such as supervisors perform that norm.87 Conversely, individuals operating 
within an organizational culture that does not value egalitarianism will tend to 
become less tolerant.88 Consequently, adopting office norms that demonstrate 
a commitment to equality will likely increase behavior in keeping with that 
norm. In sum, being deliberate about instilling a culture that strives for the 
provision of equitable public defense will not only better serve indigent clients 
but will also create an environment conducive to reducing the effects of IBs. 
B. Objective Triage Standards 
Offices should develop triage standards because the wholly discretionary 
decisionmaking that currently exists does nothing to curb IBs. While we do not 
advance specific standards in this short Essay, we suggest some criteria offices 
should utilize when developing them. 
First, offices should not rank cases based upon the perceived possibility of 
factual innocence, as some have suggested.89 Given the limited time defenders 
have to prioritize cases, innocence determinations can only be speculative 
hunches based upon inadequate information. Implicit biases thrive under these 
circumstances. 
Second, triage standards ought to be based upon criteria that are objectively 
measurable, i.e., criteria that are not subject to interpretation. An example is to 
prioritize cases based upon custody status, with in-custody clients being given 
priority. Another is to prioritize cases randomly, or to reserve a subset (e.g., 
twenty-five percent) to be prioritized at random. Alternatively, defenders could 
prioritize cases based upon the speedy trial date. What these suggestions have 
in common is that they do not rely upon attorneys’ subjective or idiosyncratic 
judgments. While imperfect, these proposals exemplify the types of objective 
 
87.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Levy Paluck & Hana Shepherd, The Salience of Social Referents: A Field 
Experiment on Collective Norms and Harassment Behavior in a School Social Network, 103 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 899 (2012) (demonstrating the importance of collective 
norms to changing behavior); see also Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended 
Thought and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 123 (2004) 
(discussing the motivation to conform to group norms); Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles 
Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 649-51 (2001) (finding that peers can influence racial 
attitudes and that participants’ implicit beliefs about African Americans became less 
stereotypic if they discovered that their peer group was more egalitarian than themselves)  
88.  Fiske, supra note 87, at 123. 
89.  See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from 
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004); John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth 
Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1276-78 (1994). 
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criteria offices can utilize to focus attorney decision-making away from client 
stereotypes. 
Although objective standards are important, attorneys cannot avoid 
subjective decisionmaking altogether. For instance, even if offices decided that 
attorneys should focus their energies on cases where clients are in custody, or 
on cases with clients facing the stiffest potential punishment, attorneys would 
still have to make subjective judgments about how to prioritize cases within a 
given category. Unfortunately, IBs may affect these judgments. Thus, while 
triage standards are important, they are not the panacea for IBs. Rather, offices 
should also employ the additional strategies mentioned in this Part to reduce 
IBs’ effects. 
C. Accountability 
Offices should also institute accountability mechanisms. Creating checklists 
that attorneys can use when evaluating their cases is one such mechanism.90 
Checklists can help reduce biased judgments because having predetermined 
criteria to guide decisionmaking can hinder people’s unintentional tendency to 
change the criteria upon which their decisions are based in order to fit their 
preferred course of action.91 
Additionally, offices should collect data about attorneys’ decisions. This 
data will not only inform attorneys and offices about trends, but will also give 
offices the ability to monitor their attorneys’ judgments. This data should 
include information about guilty pleas, sentencing outcomes, time spent on 
cases, and the number of meetings with clients broken down by race and initial 
charges. Once this data is collected, we recommend that PD offices use a simple 
accountability rule: defenders must be able to explain any racial disparities in 
how they allocated their resources. This rule can reduce IB because people 
exercise more care when they know their decisions are monitored and will have 
to be explained,92 and because thinking more carefully and deliberately helps to 
debias.93 
 
90.  Hal R. Arkes & Victoria A. Shaffer, Should We Use Decision Aids or Gut Feelings?, in 
HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 411, 411-13 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2004). 
91.  Carol Isaac, Barbara Lee & Molly Carnes, Interventions that Affect Gender Bias in Hiring: A 
Systematic Review, 84 ACAD. MED. 1440, 1444 (2009); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. 
Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit To Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474 
(2005). 
92.  See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 87, at 123 (discussing the motivations that reduce implicit bias); 
Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2259079
18.RICHARDSON&GOFF_PREPRESS_V1.DOC 4/29/2013  2:58:20 PM 




Reducing IBs is more likely when individuals are aware of the potential for 
biased decisionmaking and are aware of the possibility of safeguarding against 
the influence of implicit bias.94 Accordingly, we recommend that attorneys be 
taught about implicit biases and their probable effects on behaviors and 
judgments. This type of education is already occurring with judges, so it 
should be fairly simple to implement this suggestion.95 
Additionally, offices should consider requiring or encouraging defenders to 
take the Implicit Association Test (IAT), the most widely used mechanism for 
revealing the existence of implicit bias.96 A recent study suggests that receiving 
feedback about IAT results can debias.97 Because the sole purpose of any such 
requirement would be to inform defenders of their own probable biases, they 
must not be required to disclose the results. This suggestion will be easy to 
implement because the IAT is available online and provides immediate 
feedback. If individuals are made aware of the fact that IBs may affect their 
behaviors and judgments in ways they would not consciously endorse, they 
likely will be motivated to exercise more care in their decisionmaking and to 
engage in efforts to reduce the potential for bias. 
E. Intentional Goals 
Defender offices can also utilize a variety of techniques that, in research 
contexts, have allowed people to reduce the effects of IB on their behaviors and 
 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 267–70 (1999) (discussing how accountability can reduce cognitive 
biases). 
93.  Devine, supra note 41, at 15-16; Fiske, supra note 87, at 123-24. 
94.  Nilanjana Dasgupta & Jane G. Stout, Contemporary Discrimination in the Lab and Field: 
Benefits and Obstacles of Full-Cycle Social Psychology, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 399, 407 (2012); Jack 
Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation To Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008). 
95.  Kang et al., supra note 11, at 1175. 
96.  For descriptions of how the Implicit Association Test works, see Anthony G. Greenwald & 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 952-67 
(2006). 
97.  Gaëlle C. Pierre, Confronting Implicit Bias Through Awareness: The Role of IAT 
Performance Feedback 43-44 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York 
University), http://search.proquest.com/docview/305217552?accountid=8285. 
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judgments. These include repeated practice denouncing stereotypes,98 
affirming counterstereotypes,99 and using mental imagery.100 Even thinking 
about ourselves as being less objective than we imagine ourselves to be can 
reduce the effects of IBs.101 
One successful technique involves people developing intentional and 
specific plans for what they will think or do in situations likely to activate IBs. 
These are “consciously formed if-then plans that indicate the specific cognitive 
or behavioral response that is to be made at a specific time and place.”102 The 
“if x, then y” formulation is critical because simpler goals such as “I will not use 
stereotypes in my judgments” are generally ineffective.103 
In a recent study demonstrating the efficacy of this technique, researchers 
had subjects watch a video that contained photographs of either black men or 
white men posed in front of different backgrounds and holding either guns or 
crime-irrelevant objects such as cell phones.104 Participants were asked to 
determine as quickly as possible whether or not the men were armed by 
pressing buttons labeled “shoot” or “don’t shoot.” Similar “shooter-bias” 
studies typically demonstrate that subjects mistakenly shoot unarmed blacks 
more often than unarmed whites because of IB. They also shoot armed targets 
more quickly when they are black as opposed to white.105 In this particular 
study, however, researchers found that when subjects formed a specific,  
 
98.  Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Training in the Negation of 
Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 871 
(2000). The effect only lasted for twenty-four hours. 
99.  Nilanjana Dasgupta, Mechanisms Underlying the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and 
Stereotypes: The Role of Automaticity and Cognitive Control, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, 
STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 267, 279 (Todd D. Nelson ed. 2009). 
100.  Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining Stereotypes Away: The 
Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 828 (2001). 
101.  Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of Self-
Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210-11 (2007). 
102.  Saaid A. Mendoza, Peter M. Gollwitzer & David M. Amodio, Reducing the Expression of 
Implicit Stereotypes: Reflexive Control Through Implementation Intentions, 36 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 512, 513 (2010). 
103.  See id. 
104.  Id. at 515. 
105.  See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions To Shoot, 37 EUR. J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1102 (2007). 
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goal-directed plan to ignore race before beginning the task, they were able to 
reduce shooter bias.106 
Of course, in PD offices, it may not be advisable to tell attorneys to ignore 
the client’s race, especially because in criminal justice contexts, IBs are less 
likely to be expressed when race is made explicit.107 Fortunately, research 
demonstrates that these “if-then” plans are effective even when social 
categories are salient. For instance, in a recent study published in 2012, 
researchers found that when subjects formed a specific plan to associate 
Muslims with peace as opposed to terrorism, they showed reduced IB.108 These 
researchers also found that “if-then” goal-directed thinking can reduce IBs in 
real-world decisionmakers, and that this reduction can be sustained over 
time.109 
These studies suggest an intriguing strategy for reducing IBs’ effects on 
defender decisionmaking. For instance, when reviewing the discovery in a new 
case, attorneys could form a specific plan to focus on the weaknesses of the 
state’s case or to think of the client as innocent. In other words, defenders 
might be asked to form the following specific intention: “If my client is black, 
then I will think ‘innocent’ when reviewing the discovery.” While it may be 
difficult to believe that such a simple intervention would reduce the effects of 
implicit bias, its simplicity is similar to the specific intention that reduced the 
effects of shooter bias.110 The utility of this strategy has not been tested in the 
public defense context, but, in light of its success across numerous studies in 
other contexts, there is reason for optimism.  
 
106.  Mendoza, Gollwitzer & Amodio, supra note 102, at 516. 
107.  See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of 
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201 
(2001). 
108.  Thomas L. Webb, Paschal Sheeran & John Pepper, Gaining Control over Responses to Implicit 
Attitude Tests: Implementation Intentions Engender Fast Responses on Attitude-Incongruent 
Trials, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 22-24 (2012). 
109.  Id. 
110.  See Mendoza, Gollwitzer & Amodio, supra note 102, at 515. The researchers provided 
subjects with an instruction that read, “You should be careful not to let other features of the 
targets affect the way you respond. In order to help you achieve this, research has shown it 
to be helpful for you to adopt the following strategy: If I see a person, then I will ignore his 
race!” Id. Subjects who formed this specific intention made fewer errors than subjects in the 
control group who were not given the additional instruction. 
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Despite the fact that many public defenders are committed to zealous and 
effective advocacy, there is abundant reason for concern that implicit racial 
biases may affect their decisions. By highlighting the effects of implicit bias, we 
do not suggest that other structural inequities in the provision of indigent 
defense are unimportant. Rather, we seek to supplement existing critiques with 
our observations. Furthermore, some PDs might believe that their experiences 
making difficult resource allocation decisions immunize their intuitive, gut-
driven triage judgments from the effects of IBs. However, IBs are likely to have 
their most damaging effects precisely when individuals fail to question their 
gut instincts. Moreover, without data collection, it is simply impossible to 
know whether similarly situated clients are being treated alike. 
As public defenders seek to provide the best legal representation possible 
for indigent clients in order to fulfill Gideon’s promise, it is crucial not only that 
they remain open to the possibility that they are being influenced by IBs, but 
also that they be given the full array of tools necessary to protect the values of 
equality and fairness on which the legitimacy of our criminal justice system 
rests. Thus, we hope that public defenders will engage in data collection and 
create partnerships with social psychologists to determine when IBs are likely 
to influence defenders’ judgments and to develop specific defender-oriented 
approaches for reducing IBs’ effects.111 Indigent clients deserve no less. 
 
111.  Dasgupta & Stout, supra note 94 (suggesting the importance of field research to help 
translate lab findings into real-world contexts). 
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